We analyze an alternating o¤er bargaining game between a developing country (South) and a multinational over entry to sell a patented product where the South can issue a compulsory license if an agreement is not reached by a deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features: (i) the surplus from entry prior to the deadline may be negative and (ii) Compulsory licensing (CL) may yield higher surplus than entry. We establish conditions under which equilibrium exhibits immediate entry, preemptive entry, or the occurrence of CL and examine the welfare e¤ects of the CL option on both parties.
Introduction
A crucial policy issue confronting low and middle income countries is how to obtain access to patented medicines at a¤ordable prices. In the absence of local patent protection, such countries could buy generic versions of these products from pharmaceutical companies in countries such as India and China that were capable of producing them. However, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) essentially eliminated this option by requiring all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide a minimum of 20 years of patent protection. As a result, governments across the world now need to rely primarily on negotiations with patent holders to obtain price reductions.
A major problem developing countries encounter during these negotiations is that pharmaceutical companies can be unwilling to cut prices of their patented products, even when local pro…ts could be made, because of the fear of undermining their ability to sustain higher prices in other countries. There are two factors that can justify a patent holder's concern about price spillovers between markets. First, international price discrimination can be undone by the ‡ow of parallel imports from low price markets to high price ones. Second, governments of many countries resort to external reference pricing when bargaining over prices with pharmaceutical companies or setting their local price controls, a policy under which the prices that they are willing to permit locally depend on prices being charged by …rms in other countries. This governmental practice can put …rms in the awkward position of having to explain why they need to charge high prices in some countries when they …nd it pro…table to sell at low prices in other countries.
Due to these concerns about international price spillovers, pharmaceutical companies may deliberately choose not to serve the local markets of many developing countries. What recourse does a developing country have when it …nds itself in such a situation? As it turns out, WTO rules pertaining to intellectual property provide an escape route. When faced with limited or no access to a patented foreign product, a country may resort to compulsory licensing, i.e., an authorization granted to someone other than the patent-holder to produce the patented product without the patent-holder's consent. 1 Our goal in this paper is to analyze how the potential issuance of a compulsory license a¤ects price negotiations between a patent holder and a developing country.
Motivated by WTO ground rules that govern the use of compulsory licensing (CL) and recent experience with CL (discussed in Section 2.2 below), we develop and analyze an alternating o¤ers bargaining game between a multinational …rm and the government of a developing country (called 1 Parallel imports from another low price market would be an option but this cannot be exercised if the company chooses to forsake that other market for the same reason. The freedom to allow parallel imports and the option to use compulsory licensing are widely seen as the two major ‡exibilities available under TRIPS to WTO member countries -see Maskus (2000a and 2000b ) for a detailed discussion of these ‡exibilities. South). In our model, as the sole producer of a patented good, the multinational negotiates with the South over the terms of its entry into the local market. An agreement between the two parties consists of a price charged in the South for the duration of the patent and a lump sum transfer (which can be negative) paid by the multinational. We assume that the two parties have complete information about payo¤s and analyze how the threat of CL a¤ects the timing of entry by the multinational and the distribution of surplus between them. We model the WTO rules on CL as providing an exogenously given time at which the South can unilaterally terminate the bargaining problem by issuing a compulsory license, and analyze how this deadline a¤ects the outcome of the bargaining game.
Two fundamental features of our bargaining problem distinguish it from the standard alternating o¤ers bargaining game. The …rst concerns the amount of (per-period) surplus generated by the entry of the multinational into the Southern market. The loss in pro…ts su¤ered by the multinational in its home (North) market due to price spillovers from the South raises the possibility that the additional surplus generated by its Southern entry is actually negative. In such a scenario, there exists no price-transfer pair that can make both parties better o¤ if the multinational enters the South. The second crucial feature of our bargaining problem is the di¤erence between the surplus under CL and entry. If the Southern licensee cannot produce a su¢ ciently high quality version of the patented product, the payo¤ generated under CL is lower than that under entry. However, it is also possible that the CL yields a larger payo¤ than entry. To see how this can happen, …rst note that WTO rules require that sales under a compulsory license should be restricted to the local market of the country issuing the license. Thus, to be compliant with WTO rules, the South has an incentive to discourage any arbitrage trade that can spill over to the multinational's home market.
Similarly, any external reference pricing policy on the part of the North cannot reasonably hold the multinational accountable for the price of its product in the South under CL since production and pricing are no longer controlled by it. Thus, by reducing the degree of price spillovers between markets, the issuance of a compulsory license has the potential to increase the surplus available to the two parties.
Our results show how the timing of the multinational's entry into the South and the split of the surplus between the two parties is determined by the two basic features of the bargaining problem discussed above. In the case where the surplus generated by entry is positive and exceeds that under a compulsory license, the threat of CL only redistributes surplus from the multinational to the South (provided the threat is credible). If the surplus generated by entry is negative, the multinational may make a preemptive o¤er just prior to the deadline to prevent the imposition of a compulsory license. If this happens, the South bene…ts at the expense of the multinational because it obtains a high quality product that would otherwise not have been available to its consumers.
In both cases, the payo¤ to the South is decreasing in the length of the delay period that must elapse before the South is free to issue a compulsory license. Furthermore, CL may be observed in equilibrium, even though it yields lower surplus than entry if the bargaining friction (de…ned as the time between o¤ers) is su¢ ciently large.
We …nd that CL can also arise in equilibrium if it results in a higher payo¤ than entry and the required delay period before it can be implemented is not too long. The latter condition is important because even if the surplus under CL is higher than that under entry, it may not be worth delaying agreement too much to obtain that higher level of surplus. We also show that each party's equilibrium payo¤ in this case depends on the division of surplus under CL, leading to a variety of possible outcomes. In cases where a compulsory license is imposed in equilibrium, the payo¤ to the South is decreasing in the delay period before the license can be imposed. The multinational's payo¤, on the other hand, can be either increasing or decreasing in the required delay period, depending on its share of total surplus under CL.
An interesting result of our paper is that it is possible for the South to receive a lower average payo¤ in equilibrium when there exists a credible threat of CL relative to what it receives in the absence of such a threat. This paradoxical outcome can only arise when CL yields a higher payo¤ than entry and the multinational's share of that higher surplus exceeds its share under bargaining (absent the threat of CL). The possibility of the multinational receiving a larger share of the surplus under CL arises if the license provides a substantial royalty payment to the multinational while also leading to an e¤ective segmentation of the Southern market from the Northern one. Under these conditions, the threat of CL can lower the South's equilibrium payo¤ in one of two ways. First, even though the South earns a higher per period payo¤ under CL, the payo¤ starts to accrue only after the license goes into e¤ect. It follows then that the South can be made worse o¤ due to the threat of CL if the delay incurred before it can impose the license is su¢ ciently long.
The threat of CL can also lower the South's average payo¤ when the bargaining outcome results in immediate entry provided the two conditions isolated above -i.e. a larger surplus under CL relative to entry coupled with a larger share for the multinational -continue to hold. The South's loss in this case arises because the possibility of CL weakens its bargaining position. Even though the multinational cannot itself issue a compulsory license, it can delay agreement until the Southern government can do so. In such a situation, the South's ability to use CL actually shifts bargaining power in favor of the multinational. Indeed, when the multinational has an incentive to delay agreement until a compulsory license can be issued, the South would be better o¤ it could pre-commit to not issuing such a license.
Our analysis of price negotiations in the shadow of CL is related to the literature that examines bargaining under a deadline. One strand of this literature deals with the commitment e¤ect of a deadline in a setting where a seller makes o¤ers to a buyer with private information about his valuation of the object. According to the well known Coase Conjecture (e.g. Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)), the inability of the seller to commit to future prices causes its pro…t to vanish as the time between o¤ers goes to zero. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) analyze the role of deadlines in a bargaining model by introducing an exogenously given deadline at which the players receive a payo¤ whose total can be no more than the buyer's valuation if no agreement has been reached. 2 They show that the seller's payo¤ converges to the present value of making a …nal o¤er at the deadline as the time between o¤ers goes to zero. Thus, the deadline improves the seller's bargaining position by putting a bound on the extent to which the seller will cut price in the continuous time limit. Our analysis abstracts from this role of deadlines by assuming that parties have complete information about valuations. In our case, the payo¤ to the parties in the event of an agreement is the weighted average of the payo¤ that would be received if the compulsory license is imposed at the deadline and the payo¤ that would be received in the absence of a deadline.
A second focus of the literature on deadlines is the e¤ect of deadlines on the timing of agreements. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) show that the existence of a deadline results in a mass of agreements being reached at the deadline, in order to avoid the shrinkage in payo¤ that arises if no agreement is reached. Spier (1992) considers the problem of pre-trial negotiation, where a plainti¤ makes o¤ers to a defendant with private information about the size of damages. In her model, the two sides often fail to reach agreement and when settlement takes place, it usually does so quite close to the deadline. Introducing …xed costs of bargaining into the model delivers a U shaped pattern of settlement, i.e., there is greater chance that the two parties reach agreement at the beginning or at the end of negotiations relative to the middle. Spier (1992) also considers the case in which the plainti¤ has the option of choosing the time at which to go to trial, so that the deadline is endogenously determined.
In our model, the full information assumption means that if an agreement on entry is reached, it will either occur immediately or right before the deadline. The latter case arises if CL reduces the total payo¤ and bargaining frictions are su¢ ciently large. The possibility that the joint payo¤ increases under a compulsory license also means that it can be in the interest of both parties to have the license imposed, which can result in a delay in the serving of the Southern market relative to the case where a compulsory license cannot be issued.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief discussion of the empirical evidence that motivates our model. Section 3 presents our bargaining game and derives its equilibrium when CL is not an available option for the South. Section 4 introduces CL and analyzes how it a¤ects equilibrium outcomes and welfare. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
Empirical relevance of the model
This section discusses the key empirical facts motivating our model. First, we summarize the relevant …ndings of the empirical literature on international price spillovers arising from parallel imports and the governmental practise of external reference pricing. Next, we provide a brief discussion of the WTO rules on compulsory licensing and discuss some recent CL episodes to illustrate the role of CL in the bargaining process.
International price spillovers
A number of studies have found evidence that the new pharmaceutical products are not launched or experience substantial launch delays in markets where income levels are low and where there are price controls. 3 While these factors lead to lower prices and pro…ts in that particular market, they can also a¤ect pro…tability in other markets. For example, Kyle (2007) studied drug launches in the 28 largest pharmaceutical markets from 1980-2000 and found that a country's use of price controls not only delays drug launches into its own market, but also lowers prices that other countries are willing to pay. 4 One source of such international spillovers is the policy of external reference pricing, under which a country uses the prices at which products are sold in other markets in setting the regulated prices for its own market. Ruggeri and Nolte (2013) countries where reference pricing is not an explicit policy, the presence of low prices in other markets can generate public pressure for price reductions. For example, high prices of pharmaceuticals in the US relative to the rest of the world frequently stirs up debate and discussion in the US press as well as the Congress. 5 As Goldberg (2010) notes, by delaying access to drugs or denying it altogether, reference pricing policies in high-price countries impose welfare costs on low-price countries and can potentially justify the use of CL on their part.
A second channel for price spillovers is the existence of parallel trade. The EU allows free ‡ow of parallel imports within its territory, which puts a limit on the extent to which …rms can price discriminate between EU countries. By some estimates, such trade accounts for about 10% of the total EU market for pharmaceuticals. 6 As one might expect, parallel trade within the EU generally ‡ows from low price markets such as Greece and Spain to high price markets such as Germany, UK, Netherlands, and the Scandinavian region. Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) found that after Sweden joined the EU and opened its pharmaceutical market to parallel imports, prices of drugs that were subject to competition from parallel trade declined 12-19%. 7 Such trade is not legal between most developed and developing countries, but illegal trade still has the potential to arise if there are substantial price di¤erences between markets. For example, it is well known that the presence of price controls in Canada creates incentives for the illegal importation of pharmaceuticals into the US from Canada.
Price negotiations and compulsory licensing
Article 31 of TRIPS lays down rules that govern the use of CL by WTO member countries. In addition to the requirement that a compulsory license can be issued only if the patent is not worked locally, these rules require that CL "may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made e¤orts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such e¤orts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time." 8 Article 31 also requires that "adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 5 A discussion of a few of these incidents is available in Pecorino (2002) and Roy and Saggi (2012) . See also the recent report by the USTR on US international frictions related to intellectual property rights: 2013 Special 301 Report.
6 See "European drug groups fear parallel trade" Financial Times, June 7, 2010. 7 Note that the mere possibility that such trade can arise puts limits on the ability of …rms to engage in international price discrimination. This implies that the observed price declines and the volume of parallel trade are likely to underestimate the true impact of the possibility of parallel trade on the pricing behavior of …rms. 8 The WTO does not provide a minimum time required to pass before a compulsory license can be applied for. However, it does require that the standards of the Paris Convention on Industrial property be adhere to. Article 5 of the Paris convention speci…ed a minimum time period of four years from the application for a patent or three years from the granting of a patent, whichever is greater. account the economic value of the authorization" must be paid to the patent-holder and that the compulsory license "shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use". The 2001 Doha Ministerial conference expanded these powers by allowing compulsory licenses to be issued to producers in third countries in order to make CL accessible to those countries that lacked the capability to produce pharmaceuticals products domestically.
In addition to providing a means for countries to obtain access to a patented product when the local market is not being served, the TRIPS agreement also grants certain protections to patent holders. For example, countries issuing a compulsory license must provide a means for patent holders to have the ability to challenge a compulsory license. More importantly, Ho (2011, Ch 5) notes that, in the event of CL, the home country of the patent holder can challenge the compulsory license before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. Since the DSB has the potential to authorize trade sanctions as remedies against countries that fail to honor their WTO obligations, it provides an external enforcement mechanism that can help prevent violations of the various WTO clauses governing CL such as providing compensation to patent holders and preventing export sales of products produced under CL. 9 From the rati…cation of TRIPS in 1995 to 2011 there have been 24 international episodes where negotiations between developing countries and pharmaceutical companies proceeded to the point where CL was publicly considered or implemented. These episodes involved public o¢ cials and/or governments of 17 WTO members and covered 40 drug patents and 22 pharmaceuticals (Beall and Kuhn, 2012) . About half of these episodes ended up with the issuance of a compulsory license while nine of them resulted in signi…cant price reductions and can be interpreted as a successful bargaining outcome between pharmaceutical companies and developing countries. In cases where compulsory license were issued, patent holders received royalties ranging from 0.5% of the generic price to 2% of revenues from the sale of the product. 10 These cases illustrate the role CL plays in negotiations between multinationals and developing countries. In some cases, the threat of a compulsory license served as an e¤ective means of negotiating a lower price for the product, while in others the result was the issuance of a compulsory license. Brazil's experience with negotiations over the price of AIDS drugs provides examples of 9 Although there have been no complaints to the DSB involving compulsory licenses so far, the TRIPS agreement as a whole has been cited in 34 complaints.
1 0 The World Health Organization (2005) provides guidelines for calculating royalty rates for compulsory licenses. These royalty rates for CL are substantially below those from voluntary licenses, which typically average around 5%. This gap between the two types of royalties probably re ‡ects the di¤erence between the TRIPS mandated "adequate remuneration " that must be paid to the patent-holder under a compulsory license and the "reasonable commercial terms" of a market-based voluntary license issued by the patent-holder. both cases. Brazil's Health Minister threatened CL of nel…navir (one of the twelve drugs used by the health ministry to combat HIV/AIDS) when price negotiations with Roche, the manufacturer of the drug, ran into di¢ culties. While price negotiations were ongoing, publicly visible e¤orts were made by Brazil to prepare Farmanguinhos -the leading government owned pharmaceutical manufacturer -to initiate local production of the drug. In response, Roche agreed to reduce the price of nel…navir by 40%, an o¤er that Brazil accepted. Similarly, Brazil threatened the CL of Kaletra, an HIV/AIDS medicine produced by Abbott but never actually implemented the threat since Abbott agreed to reduce the annual per patient cost of Kaletra by a substantial amount. Emboldened by its success with Abbott and Roche, Brazil negotiated fairly aggressively with Merck over the price of Efavirenz, another patented AIDS drug. Interestingly, do Nascimento (2010) notes that during these price negotiations the Brazilian government explicitly used external reference pricing as a strategy by noting that Merck was selling Efavirenz for relatively lower prices in some other middle income countries. These negotiations over Merck's price eventually broke down and ended with Brazil issuing a …ve-year compulsory license for Efavirenz, with Merck receiving a royalty of 1.5% on local sales of the drug.
These examples illustrate that in some cases the threat of CL results in a preemptive o¤er by the patent-holder to deter the issuing of a compulsory license, while in other cases the patent-holder prefers to allow a compulsory license to be issued rather than agree to further price reductions.
Existing evidence also shows that the quality of the product provided by a potential licensee is a major concern in the implementation of CL, since it may take time to develop the technology to produce the product and generic versions may not be equivalent to the patented products. 11 
Model
We consider a multinational …rm that has two markets for its patented product, North and South.
The patent has a …nite duration (T ) during which the multinational has a monopoly over the product in both markets. Motivated by the empirical evidence discussed in the previous section, we examine the entry and pricing decisions of the multinational for the Southern market when there are spillovers between the two markets and the multinational negotiates the terms of its entry with the Southern government.
There is a continuum of Southern consumers, whose measure is normalized to 1. Each consumer buys (at most) one unit of the product at each point in time. If a consumer buys the good at price The multinational has a constant marginal cost for selling in each market, which we normalize to 0, yielding pro…ts j = p j d j (p j ; q) for market j = N; S: With perfect market segmentation and complete ‡exibility to price in each market, the multinational maximize pro…ts by charging a pricê : We assume that the North follows a policy of national exhaustion under which parallel imports from the South are prohibited, but we allow for some degree of arbitrage between markets that prevent the multinational from engaging in perfect market segmentation. We assume that for all values of p S at which there are sales in the South (i.e. p S < q), the price in the North is subject to the no arbitrage constraint: p N kp S . This no arbitrage condition would arise if the detection of parallel imports were to be imperfect, as is likely to be the case in the real world. If denotes the probability that a seller engaged in arbitrage is caught and has its products con…scated, then
captures the degree to which the Southern price spills over to (or constrains) the price in the North. The no arbitrage condition will bind for p S < min mq 2k ; q ; so we can express the multinational's global pro…ts as follows:
The international pricing spillover exists as long as the Southern price is less than mq 2k , which is more likely to occur the lower the probability of detection of parallel trade and the greater the choke price in the North.
A similar speci…cation of the global pro…t function arises if the North follows an external reference pricing policy for the patented product. Under the reference pricing interpretation, the parameter k is inversely related to the responsiveness of the North's pricing policy to changes in the Southern price. In this case the spillover will exist as long as the Southern price is below a threshold level given by the North's reference pricing scheme. 12 
The bargaining problem
We assume that the multinational negotiates with the South over the terms of its entry into the local market, with an agreement consisting of a price p S 2 [0; q) to be charged in the South for the duration of the patent and a lump sum transfer to be paid by the multinational. 13 An agreement yields a per period consumer surplus to the South of
and a per period global pro…t to the multinational of G (p S ; q).
For p S 2 [0; q); there are positive sales in the Southern market and an agreement over entry generates a joint per period payo¤ of
to the two parties. We treat time as continuous, so v E = sup p S <q v(p S ; q) denotes the maximum ‡ow of returns to the two parties created by an agreement over the multinational's entry into the South.
If no agreement is reached, the multinational stays out of the South. The multinational earns a disagreement ‡ow payo¤ equal to the optimal monopoly pro…t,^ N ; in the Northern market while the South gets nothing. We can then de…ne the ‡ow of joint surplus from an agreement, which is the di¤erence between the maximum agreement payo¤ and the disagreement payo¤, as
It is straightforward to show that E is decreasing in m and n when the arbitrage constraint binds, since the multinational's loss in pro…ts in the North from entering the South is greater when the Northern market is more pro…table. Similarly, a larger impact of a price reduction in the South on the Northern price (i.e. smaller value of k) reduces E :
If the price spillover between markets is signi…cant and the Northern market is su¢ ciently pro…table, the price reduction required in the Northern market in order to sell in the South is so large that E < 0:
The following Lemma provides a characterization of the entry and pricing decisions that maximize the joint payo¤ under entry (proofs of results are in the Appendix):
such that (i) for m m ; E 0 and the joint payo¤ v(p S ; q) is maximized by selling in the Southern market at a pricep
(ii) for m > m ; E < 0
As a benchmark, we …rst examine the solution to the bargaining problem between the multinational and the South when CL is not an option. We assume that negotiations between the multinational and the South can be described by an alternating o¤ers bargaining game, which has Using backward induction arguments, we obtain the standard result that an agreement is reached immediately if entry yields a non-negative surplus. In light of our assumption of a …nite horizon for the life of the patent, the exact split of the joint surplus from entry between the two parties depends on which party moves …rst and which last. If N = 1 (i.e. D = T ), the proposer captures all of the surplus by making a take it or leave it o¤er that makes the respondent indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. As the time between o¤ers (i.e. D) decreases, the order of moves becomes less important and payo¤s approach an even split of the surplus between the two parties. Since we have no a priori reason to assume a particular order of moves, we report payo¤s for the limiting case of D ! 0 in which payo¤s are not sensitive to assumptions about the order and number of moves. 14 The alternating o¤ers bargaining game yields an e¢ cient outcome from the viewpoint of the total payo¤ of the two parties, since entry occurs only when it generates a joint surplus (i.e. E 0)
and it occurs without delay. The e¢ cient price is chosen because it is in the interest of both parties to maximize joint surplus given that a lump sum transfer is available to shift surplus between them. The limiting case eliminates any advantages derived from the order of moves, so the surplus is evenly split between the parties. Entry fails to occur when the Northern market is su¢ ciently pro…table relative to the Southern one and/or the price spillover across markets is large. As we noted in section 2, there is strong support for this result in the relevant empirical literature. 15 
Bargaining under threat of compulsory licensing
We now extend the model to allow for the possibility of CL. Suppose that if an agreement has not been reached by time T CL < T , the South can impose a compulsory license in the next period. The time period T CL captures the WTO rule that the patent-holder must be given a reasonable period of time to work its patent before a government can issue a compulsory license to another entity.
Under CL, a domestic …rm produces the patented product at marginal cost zero but its quality q CL is lower than that of the multinational (q CL q). Furthermore, the Southern government speci…es the price at which the local …rm must sell the product locally and it pays a per-period royalty R to the multinational. We treat R as an exogenously given parameter re ‡ecting the WTO 1 4 This prevents us from having to present expressions for cases with both odd and even numbered periods, which di¤er due to our assumption of a …nite horizon. This issue, as well as the …rst mover advantage, disappears as D becomes arbitrarily small. 1 5 The assumption that the payo¤ in the North market is constant in all periods leads to the result that if entry occurs, it must occur in the …rst period. If the magnitude of the price spillover to the North market is declining over time, as might happen if there is entry of competing products, then entry might occur with delay if E switches from a negative to a positive value over time. speci…ed obligation of providing reasonable compensation to the patent-holder for the use of its patent.
Under CL, the Southern government chooses the local price to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and pro…ts of the domestic …rm:
Southern welfare under CL is maximized by setting price equal to marginal cost, which yields a ‡ow payo¤ of
The price under CL equals marginal cost because the South is not required to compensate the Denote the di¤erence between the joint payo¤ under CL and the joint payo¤ under entry by CL v CL v E , which can be expressed as
The …rst term in square brackets is the di¤erence between the sum of pro…ts and consumer surplus in the Southern market under CL and entry. This term shows that CL has two con ‡icting e¤ects in the Southern market. It reduces the price at which the South obtains access to the product, but it also may result in a lower quality product being sold in the South. CL increases the sum of producer and consumer surplus in the South as long as the quality of the licensee's product satis…es
The above inequality is more likely to be satis…ed the more pro…table is the Northern market (as re ‡ected in a higher bargained price under entry,p):
The second term in (7) 
Equilibrium entry under compulsory licensing
We begin our analysis of the alternating o¤ers bargaining game by considering the decision of the South regarding whether to grant a compulsory license. We assume that the South can only issue a compulsory license when it is its turn to make a proposal. In any period after T CL at which it is the South's turn to make an o¤er, it must decide whether to issue a compulsory license or to continue bargaining with the multinational. If the average payo¤ under CL, w S CL ; exceeds the average payo¤ it can earn by continuing to bargain, then it will end the bargaining game and issue a compulsory license. Otherwise it will continue to bargain. For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that CL is a credible threat for the South:
Compulsory licensing is a credible threat for the South if the quality of the licensee's product is not too low or when the required royalty payment R to the multinational is not too high.
Under Assumption 1, the bargaining game ends at the South's …rst opportunity to move after At the outset, it is worth noting that we rule out the possibility that the South can give up its right to a compulsory license in return for a lump sum transfer from the multinational. We do so because we do not believe that such an agreement can arise in the real world due to two reasons. First, it seems unlikely that a multinational would be able to enforce such an agreement if the South were to renege on its commitment once it had reached the time at which it is allowed to issue a compulsory license. Such an agreement between the multinational and the Southern government would be unenforceable at the WTO because WTO treaties are contracts between sovereign nations. Private agents (individuals or …rms) have no standing at the WTO. Thus, any agreement between the multinational …rm and the South over the latter agreeing to give up its right to issue a compulsory license cannot be interpreted as a WTO obligation. The only option facing the multinational would be to enforce such an agreement in a domestic court in the South, which would be problematic for obvious reasons. A second reason as to why such an agreement between the two parties may be infeasible in the real world is that the Southern government would likely …nd it politically unpalatable to enter into an agreement with a foreign …rm under which it deliberately agrees to deny local consumers access to a patented product (such as an AIDS medicine) in return for a cash transfer. Any transfers made to the government would not bene…t those most in need of the patented product, making the agreement politically unpopular. In fact, governments in developing countries generally face signi…cant public pressure from citizens, public interest watch groups, and non-governmental organizations to provide access to patented pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we discuss the e¤ect of relaxing this assumption in section 4.4.
In analyzing the bargaining game, we …rst identify the entry decision for periods i = 0; :::; N CL 1 that maximizes the total payo¤ to the two parties over the duration of the patent, given the threat of CL at N CL 1 if no agreement as been reached by that time. We then show that the solution to the bargaining problem results in the entry time that maximizes this total payo¤.
The present value payo¤ to the two parties at time 0 if the multinational enters in period i equals V E 0 (i) = ^ N 1 e rDi + v E e rDi e rDN =r i = 1; ::N CL 1
The payo¤ to entry at time i is the sum of the return from sales in the North market only for i = 0; ::; i 1 and sales in both markets from i until the end of the patent. Since rV E 0 (i) V E 0 (i 1) = E (e rD(i 1) e rDi )=r; the total payo¤ from entry will be maximized by entry at time 0 if E > 0 and at time N CL 1 if E < 0: The joint payo¤ to the two parties time 0 of waiting for a compulsory license is
The payo¤ from waiting for CL depends on both the ‡ow payo¤s under CL and the North market pro…ts earned during the delay period preceding the compulsory license. Proposition 2 The joint payo¤ maximizing regime, subject to the constraint that a CL is issued if there is no entry prior to DN CL ; takes the following form:
(a) For CL < 0 and E 0; the multinational should enter at i = 0:
(b) For CL < 0 and E < 0; entry should occur in period N CL 1 if
CL (e The question of whether entry or CL yields higher total payo¤ depends on a comparison of the discounted joint surplus from entry prior to the issuance of a CL and the ‡ow payo¤ di¤erential during the period when CL would be in e¤ect. When CL and E have the opposite sign, the result is unambiguous because both comparisons favor the same regime. In (a), entry is preferred to both staying out and CL, so immediate entry must result. In part (d), staying out dominates entry while CL is better than entry, making CL the surplus maximizing regime.
For the remaining cases where E and CL have the same sign, there are con ‡icting e¤ects because one component favors CL while the other favors entry. Part (b) is the case in which entry is less attractive than staying out but more attractive than CL. Entry by the multinational in the last possible period minimizes the losses resulting from the international price spillovers prior to the date at which a compulsory license is imposed, while avoiding the losses that would result in the imposition of a compulsory license during period N CL . The losses from entry prior to T CL shrink to 0 as D ! 0; so that preemptive entry maximizes total surplus provided bargaining frictions are small enough that entry can occur arbitrarily close to the deadline for CL. Part (c) is the case where entry is more attractive than staying out, but CL is more attractive than entry in terms of a per period payo¤ comparison. The question then becomes whether the delay prior to CL is su¢ ciently short so that it is worth waiting for it.
Recall that in the absence of the threat of CL, the solution to the bargaining problem results in entry by the multinational at the time that maximizes total surplus. We now show that this result also applies when the South can impose a compulsory license.
Lemma 2 In the alternating o¤ ers bargaining game with CL, the solution results in the …rst acceptable o¤ er for entry being made at the surplus maximizing entry time identi…ed in Proposition 2.
This result is due to the fact that the proposer at any period i has an interest in choosing the decision that makes joint surplus as large as possible. Consider for example the decision at N CL 1;
the last period before a CL would be imposed. The best acceptable o¤er by the multinational makes the South indi¤erent between accepting and waiting to impose a compulsory license at N CL ; which yields the multinational a payo¤ of
If the multinational does not make an o¤er, its payo¤ is the return to waiting until a compulsory license is issued in the next period,
Entry is preferred to waiting for a compulsory license at N CL 1 if
It can be seen from (10) that this condition will be satis…ed i¤ V E 0 (N CL 1) V CL 0 0; so an o¤er is made at N CL 1 i¤ entry at N CL 1 yields a joint payo¤ that is at least as high as that obtained by waiting for a CL. The Lemma then follows using induction arguments. Table 1 summarizes how the threat of CL a¤ects the equilibrium of the bargaining game. can be issued when both CL and staying out dominate entry (i.e. CL > 0 and E < 0)). In this case CL provides the South with access to a product that it would not have had otherwise. Second, CL can arise when it is preferred to entry ( CL > 0) but entry is preferred to staying out ( E 0) and the delay period preceding CL is not too long. In this case, CL delays access to the product for the South because joint surplus is higher if the multinational stays out and reaps monopoly pro…ts in the North market until the compulsory license is imposed. The third and …nal scenario where CL can arise is one where entry is preferred to CL ( CL < 0), staying out is preferred to entry ( E < 0), and bargaining frictions are su¢ ciently large. In this case as well, the threat of CL ensures that the South obtains access to the patented product that it would not have had otherwise, but the product is not provided by the most e¢ cient means. Once the option of staying out is o¤ the table, total surplus would be higher if the product were provided via entry as opposed to CL.
However, bargaining frictions prevent multinational from making an acceptable o¤er to the South prior to the deadline for CL.
We now turn to the question of how the threat of CL a¤ects the respective payo¤s of the two parties.
Equilibrium Payo¤s with CL < 0
We begin with the case in which CL yields a lower joint payo¤ than entry, so that both parties have an interest in avoiding the imposition of a compulsory license. We can state:
Proposition 3 In the bargaining game with a CL deadline of T CL and CL < 0; the equilibrium payo¤ s have the following properties:
(a) If E 0; entry occurs in the …rst period. The average payo¤ to the South in the limiting
and the average payo¤ to the multinational iŝ
where (T CL ) = from the previous case is that in addition to redistributing surplus, the threat of CL also changes the entry decision when E < 0 and bargaining frictions are not too large.
To illustrate the e¤ect of the deadline for the case of CL > 0, we provide a numerical example that is illustrated in Figure 1 . The horizontal dotted line in Figure 1 at E 2 = 0:14 represents the payo¤ to each party when there is no threat of CL. Parameter values are chosen such that the multinational (labelled M in Figure 1 ) produces a higher quality product than the licensee, but the payo¤ to the South (labelled S) under a compulsory license exceeds E 2 due to the South's ability to price the product at marginal cost and pay a relatively low royalty to the multinational . 16 The vertical intercepts of the payo¤ loci for the respective parties in Figure 1 represent their respective payo¤s under a compulsory license, since T CL = 0 corresponds to immediate use of CL. In this example, the multinational receives a payo¤ that is less than its outside option payo¤ of^ N when T CL is su¢ ciently low. The South is able to capture more than the surplus from entry in this case because it must be compensated for its threat to impose a CL. As T CL increases, the value of CL as a threat point decreases and surplus is redistributed from the South toward the multinational.
The payo¤ to each party converges to E 2 as T CL approaches T = 20, the duration of the patent. It should be noted that the payo¤ to the multinational is independent of its payo¤ in the event that a compulsory license is issued, w M CL , as long as it continues to satisfy CL < 0: This is due to the assumption that for all D > 0, the South is only able to impose the compulsory license at the …rst period after T CL in which it is the proposer. The multinational always has the chance to 1 6 We assume q = 1; n = 2 and m = 3:5. These parameter values re ‡ect a Northern market that has a larger scale (n) and a larger choke price (m) than the South, and result in a pro…t maximizing price of 7 4 in the North and 1 2 in the South. With a spillover parameter of k = 2:5; we obtain a pricep = :614 that maximizes surplus and a gain from entry of E = :285. While the Southern market is less pro…table than the Northern market, the pricing spillover is su¢ ciently small that entry yields higher pro…ts than staying out. We assume that the product has a useful life of T = 20; and that the discount factor r = :05: In the event of a compulsory license, it is assumed that the quality of the licensee's product is qCL = :8 and that the multinational receives a royalty of R = :025; which is 10% of its monopoly pro…t. These assumptions give the South a payo¤ of w S CL = :375; which exceeds the payo¤ received under bargaining without the threat of CL. make an o¤er in the last period before a compulsory license would be imposed, and at that point the multinational would make an o¤er that makes the South indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er and waiting for the compulsory license. 17 
Equilibrium Payo¤s with CL 0
We now turn to the case in which the issuance of a compulsory license increases the ‡ow surplus relative to entry. When CL has the potential to increase joint surplus, we obtain a richer set of possible impacts on the average payo¤s of the two parties. Indeed, we show below that when and the average payo¤ to the multinational iŝ
where 2 (T ; T CL ) satis…es E (e r e rT ) CL (e rT CL e rT ) = 0:
Part (a) refers to cases in which the equilibrium results in the issuance of a compulsory license at T CL : If E < 0; the CL must make the South better o¤ since it receives no payo¤ in its absence.
The average payo¤ to the multinational is a weighted average of its payo¤ from the Northern market 1 7 If we were to make the alternative assumption that the South makes the last o¤er before a compulsory license is imposed, it would choose an o¤er that makes the multinational indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er and receiving its payo¤ under the license. In that case, the multinational's payo¤ would depend on w 
:
As T CL ! 0; this condition must hold as a result of Assumption 1. Note however that the payo¤ to a CL is declining in T CL for T CL 2 [0;T ] because of the increased delay in obtaining the product as T CL increases. Therefore, the South bene…ts from a CL for all cases in (a) for E 0 if it bene…ts when T CL =T : SinceT is de…ned by the condition that E (1 e rT )=r = CL (e rT e rT )=r;
the South is at least as well o¤ for
Condition (13) shows that when CL > 0 and E 0, the fact that the threat of CL is credible is not su¢ cient to ensure that the South bene…ts from it. Since the joint surplus from a CL is exactly equal to that from entry atT ; the South's share of the surplus from a CL must be at least as large as its share of the surplus from entry (i.e. 1/2) in order for it to bene…t from the CL.
Part (b) considers the case where E 0 and T CL 2 [T ; T ], so that the deadline for imposing the compulsory license is su¢ ciently far o¤ that the joint payo¤ is maximized by immediate entry.
However, the fact that the CL yields higher per period surplus than entry means that there will exist some calendar time (T CL ) < T CL at which the surplus from entry is exactly equal to that obtained by waiting for a CL. This results in an important change in the bargaining game, since no acceptable o¤ers would be made at any t > because the surplus is larger if the parties wait for the CL. Thus, the relevant threat point for the bargaining game is the payo¤ to the proposer in the last period before time : The proposer in the last period before will receive a payo¤ equal to the di¤erence between the payo¤ from entry and the payo¤ earned by the responder if it waits for the issuance of a CL in period N CL : This last mover advantage disappears in the limit as D ! 0; because the calendar time at which the last o¤er is made will converge to . In the limiting case, the identify of the last mover does not matter because is de…ned to be the period at which the total surplus from entry exactly equals the total surplus from waiting for a CL. Each party will receive the value of its payo¤ under a CL, discounted to ; if entry occurs at :
A comparison of the payo¤s in (a) and (b) illustrates that since (T ) = 0; the payo¤s will be continuous in T CL at T CL =T : Di¤erentiating the South's payo¤ with respect to T CL (taking into account the dependence of on T CL ); it can be shown that the average payo¤ to the South is decreasing in T CL for T CL >T i¤ (13) holds. When (13) is satis…ed, the payo¤ to the South from a compulsory license is su¢ ciently high that it serves as a valuable threat point for the South, so delaying the deadline for CL harms the South's interests. In this case the payo¤ to the South will be monotonically decreasing on [0; T ]: If (13) does not hold, the threat of CL is actually bene…cial to the multinational, so the South bene…ts if the deadline for a compulsory license is delayed. Since the payo¤ to the South is less than 2 atT and equals 2 at T; the South is worse o¤ from the threat of a CL on [T ; T ):
These observations yield the following relationship between the deadline and the value of CL for the South:
Corollary 1 In the case where E 0 and CL > 0, the following hold:
(i) If inequality (13) holds, the payo¤ to the South is non-increasing in T CL and the threat of a CL cannot decrease the welfare of the South. The South is everywhere better o¤ if the inequality is strict.
(ii) If (13) fails, the payo¤ to the South is decreasing in T CL for T CL <T and increasing in T CL for T CL >T . The South is strictly worse o¤ due to the threat of CL for all T CL 2 [T ; T ) .
We conclude by providing two numerical examples that illustrate each of the cases in the Corollary. For each example, the payo¤s under entry are identical to those in Figure 1 but the CL payo¤s are chosen such that CL > 0. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium payo¤s to the parties as given by Proposition 4 for a case that is consistent with part (i) of the corollary. Here, the South captures most of the bene…ts of CL since the parameter values for this example imply that (i) the South pays a royalty to the multinational that is only 10% of the pro…ts that the multinational would have earned under entry; (ii) the licensee's product is of the same quality as that of the multinational; and (iii) CL eliminates the price spillover between markets. 18 The vertical intercepts in Figure 2 re ‡ect the average payo¤s to the respective parties under a compulsory license, and show that the South captures virtually all of the surplus under the CL in this example. For T CL <T = 6:34; a compulsory license is the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game and each party receives the present value of the compulsory license payo¤ starting at timeT : The payo¤ to both parties is decreasing in T CL in this region, because delay 1 8 Speci…cally, we assume that q = qCL = 1 and R = 0:025. With these assumptions, CL = 0:215 and w S CL = 0:475 > ( E + CL )=2 = 0:25 as required for (13) to be satis…ed. in implementing the compulsory license reduces the period over which the license operates. For T C >T ; the delay for a compulsory license is su¢ ciently long that immediate entry is preferred.
The sum of payo¤s to the two parties is constant in this interval, so the e¤ect of a change in T CL is to redistribute surplus between the parties. The payo¤ to the South is decreasing in T CL in this region, because delay weakens the use of the threat of CL for the South. The threat of CL bene…ts the South for all T CL < T in this case. The second example illustrates part (ii) of the Lemma, with the distribution of the surplus under CL favoring the multinational. The parameter values in this example di¤er in that the quality of the licensee's product is less than that of the multinational and the required royalty payment is equal to the pro…t the multinational would have earned if it entered the market and set the monopoly price. Both of these factors, i.e. a lower quality product and a higher royalty payment under CL, reduce the average CL payo¤ of the South compared with the previous case. 19 The average payo¤s to the parties under a compulsory license are shown by the vertical intercepts in Figure 3 , which illustrate that the multinational receives a higher absolute payo¤ under CL than the South. Note however that CL represents a credible threat for the South because its average payo¤ under CL exceeds that which it obtains by continuing to bargain: w S CL = 0:15 > The case where CL > 0 requires that the WTO provides an enforcement mechanism that limits spillovers to the South from sales of the patented product under a compulsory license, and that the South's promise to limit such spillovers is not credible without the external enforcement provided by the WTO (say via its dispute settlement process). We have shown that in such cases, the possibility of CL can strengthen the bargaining position of the multinational and hurt the South if the multinational's share of the surplus under a compulsory license is su¢ ciently large.
Alternative Assumptions Regarding Permissible Agreements
We conclude our analysis with a brief discussion of how our results are a¤ected under alternative assumptions regarding the types of agreements that the two parties are allowed to reach. In our …rst extension, we allow an agreement under which the multinational can make a transfer to the South in return for a promise on its part to not issue a compulsory license. If the multinational stays out, the joint payo¤ of the two parties equals the present value of its Northern pro…t: V N =^ N (1 e rT )=r;
so that the maximization of joint payo¤s involves choosing the largest of fmax V E (i); V CL ; V N g:
Staying out is dominated by entry for any i 0 when E < 0; which simpli…es the choice to maxfV N ; V E 0 (0); V CL g. Parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 2 are una¤ected by allowing for such an agreement, since V CL is dominated by V E 0 (0) in those cases. If E < 0; staying out dominates entry so the choice is essentially between staying out and CL. The introduction of the option to stay out modi…es parts (b) and (d) of Proposition 2 such that there is no entry if E < 0 and
N < 0 and a compulsory license is issued if E < 0 and E + CL > 0:
The main e¤ect of allowing the multinational to o¤er a transfer to prevent the issuance of a compulsory license is that preemptive entry by the multinational does not arise in equilibrium. A transfer to the South for it to give up CL is a less costly way for the multinational to avoid CL relative to preemptive entry, so the multinational would choose that option if it is available. The cases where E > 0 are una¤ected, so the payo¤s identi…ed in Propositions 3 and 4 for the case with E 0 continue to apply.
A second extension worth considering is the case where no transfers of any type are allowed in the bargaining game. In this case the two parties simply bargain over price if the multinational enters.
The set of Pareto undominated prices from entry are given by p 2 [0; p max ], where p = 0 re ‡ects marginal cost pricing for the product and p max = arg max G (p; q) maximizes the multinational's global pro…ts under entry. For the payo¤ functions de…ned in (1) and (2), we obtain a strictly concave payo¤ frontier for the bargaining game in the absence of transfers.
In the absence of CL, it can be shown that the multinational enters as long as its maximum The above results illustrate two ways in which bargaining frictions a¤ect the possibility of preemptive entry. The inability of the multinational to use a lump sum transfer to prevent the issuance of a compulsory license by the South, which represents a form of bargaining friction, is necessary for preemptive entry to arise. However, bargaining frictions in the form of delay between o¤ers (i.e. D > 0) make it less likely that preemptive entry occurs because the losses resulting from preemptive entry prior to the CL deadline must be incurred for a longer period of time.
Conclusion
During the last decade or so, developing countries have increasingly started to turn to CL as a tool for improving consumer access to patented foreign medicines. The available evidence indicates that in almost all cases of CL that have been observed since the rati…cation of TRIPS, price negotiations between multinational …rms selling patented drugs and developing countries have tended to precede the actual issuance of a compulsory license. This observation lies at the heart of the model developed in this paper that considers bargaining between a multinational and a developing country that wishes to gain access to its patented product at as low a price as possible.
The model compares two scenarios: one where the two parties engage in bilateral price bargaining with no possibility of CL and another where the developing country has the authority to issue a compulsory license if negotiations between the two parties do not succeed by a certain time period.
Each of the requirements speci…ed in Article 31 of TRIPS that sanctions CL plays an important role in our model. While the "adequate remuneration" rule simply ensures that CL compensates the multinational to some degree, the e¤ect of the other two rules is more subtle. For example, the requirement that CL can only be issued if the patent is not worked locally and price negotiations do not conclude successfully by a certain time period implies that, if it so chooses, the multinational can preempt the use of CL by the developing country government. Our model provides conditions under which the multinational …nds it optimal to preempt CL as well as when it does not. In the former case, the credible threat of CL weakens its bargaining position and lowers its share of the total surplus.
Our model clari…es that the possibility of CL need not necessarily lead to an outcome where one party's gains come at the expense of the other. The logic for this is as follows. Since the government issuing a compulsory license has to ensure that the patented product is sold primarily in the local market, the possibility that international pricing spillovers undermine the multinational's pro…ts in its other markets can be greatly reduced or eliminated altogether under CL. Similarly, the fact that the multinational does not control pricing and production under CL implies that the price at which the good is sold in a developing country issuing a compulsory license is less likely to run afoul of external reference pricing policies of other countries. Consequently, the low prices of drugs produced under CL are likely to have little or no bearing on high prices in rich countries.
It is clear that the enforcement of the "local consumption requirement" of the CL contract is quite valuable to the multinational. Our model shows that the proper enforcement of this requirement has the potential to expand the joint payo¤ shared between the multinational and the developing country. The implication of this result is that for the use of CL by developing countries to be more palatable to foreign patent-holders, such countries need to ensure that there is no leakage of products produced under CL to markets in rest of the world.
Although our analysis has focused on the case of compulsory licensing, our model would also apply to other bargaining problems where the payo¤ available to the two parties may increase at a pre-speci…ed deadline. Our results highlight the fact that in such situations, as the deadline approaches, the attractiveness of making an o¤er declines relative to waiting for the deadline. As a result, the ability to delay agreement until the deadline plays an important role in determining the payo¤s to the parties.
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that m > 2k; so that the no arbitrage constraint binds for Proof of Proposition 1: Letting W S i be the payo¤ to S at a subgame starting in period i at which S is the proposer and V E i = v E 1 e rD(N i) =r the current value of entry at i; we have
The …rst term in brackets is the maximum return to S from making an acceptable o¤er to M , which is the di¤erence between the joint payo¤ from entry and the payo¤ that M could earn by rejecting the o¤er and waiting to be proposer in the next period,^ N (1 e rD ) e rD W M i+1 . The second term in brackets is the return to S from not making an o¤er. Since S earns nothing if M does not enter, the value of not making an o¤er is simply the discounted value of the payo¤ in the subgame beginning at i + 1: The payo¤ to M in a period j in which it is the proposer is
Since W M N = W S N = V E N = 0; an acceptable o¤er will be made in period N 1 i¤ E 0: From (14) and (15) , an acceptable o¤er will be made in period i < N if
This condition is never satis…ed for E < 0; so M will not enter. If an o¤er is made in period i + 1;
the right side equals 0 and an o¤er will be made in period i if E 0: It then follows by induction that an acceptable o¤er will be made at i = 0 when E 0:
To solve for S's payo¤ when E 0; consider a period i < N at which S is the proposer. Since S would make an acceptable o¤er at i and M would make an acceptable o¤er at i + 1; we can substitute from (15) into (14)
Consider the case in which S moves …rst and M moves last. The patent expires at the beginning of period N; so W S N = 0. With this terminal condition, (17) yields
. Multiplying by
yields the average payo¤ of E 1+e rD for S, which gives S a …rst mover advantage for D > 0: If M moves …rst and S moves last, the payo¤ to S is e rD E (1 e rD ) r P N=2 i=1 e rD2(i 1) ; yielding an average payo¤ of e rD E 1+e rD . In either case the S payo¤ converges to E 2 as D ! 0: A similar result is obtained if one of the parties moves both …rst and last.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Entering at i dominates waiting for a CL if
If E 0; entering at i = 0 will dominate entering at any i > 0 so the comparison is between (a) E 0; CL < 0 : Condition (12) is satis…ed in this case, so an acceptable o¤er would be made at N CL 1. If an o¤er is made at i + 1 < N CL 1; the right hand side of (16) is 0 and the proposer will make an acceptable o¤er at i: It then follows by induction that an acceptable o¤er will be made at i = 0:
(b) E < 0; CL < 0 : If condition (12) fails, the proposer will not make an acceptable o¤er at N CL 1: Assuming no o¤er at i +1; the right hand hand side of (16) will be positive and no o¤er will be made at i: It follows by induction that no o¤ers will be made and the CL is imposed at N CL : If (12) is satis…ed, an o¤er will be made at N CL 1: However, no o¤er will be made at N CL 2 because the right hand side of (16) 
which is the current value of the di¤erence between the value of entering at period i and waiting until period N CL for a compulsory license: (i; DN CL ; D) will be decreasing in i in this case, with (DN CL ; DN CL ; D) < 0:
Suppose no acceptable o¤er has been made in for any period with index greater than i; so that 
Proof of Propositions 3:
(a) If E 0; then M enters at i = 0. If the bargaining game reaches period N CL then S will grant a compulsory license and receive a payo¤ of W S CL = w S CL (1 e r(T DN CL ) )=r: We know from Lemma 2 that a proposer will be willing to make an acceptable o¤er for each period i < N CL , so the payo¤ to S in a period in which S proposes will satisfy (17) (1 e rT )
: Taking 
Proof of Proposition 4:
(a) It follows from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 that a CL will be issued if either E < 0 
The payo¤ to S from this bargaining game is the payo¤ to an alternating o¤ers bargaining game in which S is the …rst mover is W S 0 = E (1 e rD ) 
Note that as D ! 0; both (20) and (21) (13) is satis…ed.
